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I. INTRODUCTION
Florida's Fourth District Court of Appeal, in its recent decision in Niko-
lits v. Verizon Wireless Personal Communications L.P.,' construed Florida's
Tax Code to not permit counties to tax "computer software" as tangible
property. 2 The decision has a profound financial impact on the taxing pow-
ers of Florida county governments given the ever increasing reliance on
computers and their software by people and businesses. This impact cuts
even deeper due to the global recession and the State of Florida's ever in-
creasing revenue woes. The decision, however, was in accordance with the
intent of the Florida Legislature. In Part II of this article, I examine the
Fourth District's decision in Nikolits. In Part I of this article, I will show
why the decision is in accordance with the legislature's intent by examining
the applicable tax statute. In my analysis, I will use as guidance the Fourth
* Anthony M. Stella is a judicial law clerk for the Honorable Fred A. Hazouri at Flori-
da's Fourth District Court of Appeal. From August 2010 until August 2012, he will serve as a
judicial law clerk for Justice R. Fred Lewis at the Supreme Court of Florida. He is also a
magna cum laude graduate from Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center,
and was the Executive Editor for Nova Law Review in 2007-08. The author is eternally grate-
ful for his family's unconditional love and support. He would also like to extend his sincerest
gratitude to Professor Stephanie Feldman Aleong, whose unwavering guidance and mentor-
ship made the author not only a better attorney, but a better person.
1. 9 So. 3d 690 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
2. Id. at 694.
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District's decision in Nikolits and a decision by the Fifth District on a similar
issue in Gilreath v. General Electric Co.3 I will also invoke the canons of
statutory interpretation. Then, in Part IV of this article, I will briefly ex-
amine the definition of a "computer" and the presumption of correctness
allocated to county tax appraisers, and then provide why, given that defini-
tion and the limitations on a county tax appraiser's taxing power, the Fourth
District's decision was correct. Lastly, I conclude with my recommendation
as to how the Florida Legislature may re-construe the applicable tax section
to permit the State of Florida to benefit from taxation of computer software
as intangible personal property.
H. THE FOURTH DISTRICT'S DECISION IN NIKOLITS
On April 15, 2009, Florida's Fourth District Court of Appeal rendered
its decision in Nikolits.4 This case arose from Palm Beach County, in 2005,
having subjected the "Wireless Services Software" of Verizon Wireless Per-
sonal Communications (Verizon) to ad valorem taxation 5 as tangible person-
6al property. Verizon paid the tax under protest, but contested the validity of
the tax by bringing suit against Palm Beach County's Property Appraiser,
Gary R. Nikolits (Nikolits).' After the trial court ruled in favor of Verizon,
Nikolits appealed the decision,8 leading to the Fourth District's decision. 9
The Wireless Services Software is run on the computer system in Veri-
zon's mobile switching center in Jupiter, Florida.' ° The computer system is
called the Autoplex 1000."1 "The Autoplex consists of a network of comput-
ers. Run on the computers are three types of software: boot software, oper-
ating system software, and the Wireless Services Software."' 2 The Wireless
Services Software enables Verizon to provide its customers with the ability
to use their cell phones to make phone calls, "send text messages, operate a
[mobile] GPS navigator, and browse the Internet.' 13 While the Autoplex is
3. 751 So. 2d 705 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
4. Nikolits, 9 So. 3d at 691.
5. BLACK'S LAW DICnONARY 57 (8th ed. 2004). Ad valorem taxation is taxation that is
"proportional to the value of the thing taxed." Id.
6. Nikolits, 9 So. 3d at 691.
7. See id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 694.
10. Id. at 692.
11. Nikolits, 9 So. 3d at 692.
12. Id. Only the taxability of the Wireless Service Software was at issue in Nikolits. See
id.
13. Id.
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the hardware that executes the software, the Wireless Services Software
gives the Autoplex and Verizon the ability to provide the aforementioned
services. "4
In Nikolits, the trial court, in interpreting Florida's Tax Code, held that
the Wireless Service Software fit section 192.001(19), Florida Statutes, defi-
nition of computer software, exempting it from taxation.15 The trial court
also found that the Wireless Services Software did not fall within section
192.001(19)'s "embedded software" exception.16 If it had, the Wireless Ser-
vice Software would have been subject to taxation. 7 Section 192.001(19)
states:
(19)"Computer software" means any information, program, or
routine, or any set of one or more programs, routines, or collec-
tions of information used or intended for use to convey informa-
tion or to cause one or more computers or pieces of computer-
related peripheral equipment, or any combination thereof, to per-
form a task or set of tasks. Without limiting the generality of the
definition provided in this subsection, the term includes operating
and applications programs and all related documentation. Com-
puter software does not include embedded software that resides
permanently in the internal memory of a computer or computer-
related peripheral equipment and that is not removable without
terminating the operation of the computer or equipment. Comput-
er software constitutes personal property only to the extent of the
value of the unmounted or uninstalled medium on or in which the
information, program, or routine is stored or transmitted, and, af-
ter installation or mounting by any person, computer software
does not increase the value of the computer or computer-related
peripheral equipment, or any combination thereof.18
14. Id. In Nikolits, the Fourth District described in greater detail the nature of the Wire-
less Service Software, stating that:
The Wireless Service Software itself consists of approximately 1000 separate programs. Ten
percent of these programs are needed for basic call processing. The other programs are used
for various diagnostic tools, various report generators, and as tools to verify that the software
has been installed properly. This means the Autoplex system will still process voice calls even
if up to ninety percent of the Wireless Services Software is uninstalled. If all of the Wireless
Services Software is uninstalled, the Autoplex processing system would still be up and run-
ning, and one could still read e-mail and do those kinds of things on those computers using the
tools that come with the operating system.
Nikolits, 9 So. 3d at 692.
15. Id. (interpreting FLA. STAT. § 192.001(19) (2009)).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. FLA. STAT. § 192.001(19) (emphasis added).
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On appeal, the Fourth District, in spite of a strong argument to the con-
trary, affirmed the trial court. 9 It also held that the Wireless Services Soft-
ware "is intangible personal property and is therefore outside of the taxing
power of Palm Beach County. 2° In so holding, it cited to the Florida Consti-
tution, as well as to the Fifth District's decision in Gilreath, stating that:
Under the Florida Constitution, local governments and coun-
ties have the power "to levy and collect ad valorem taxes on real
property and tangible personal property. The power to tax intangi-
ble personal property, however, is reserved only to the State." As
such, "if the [computer] software is intangible personal property,
the County was without authority to assess or collect taxes on it."21
i. As INTENDED BY THE FLORIDA LEGISLATURE,
"COMPUTER SOFTWARE" IS INTANGIBLE PERSONAL
PROPERTY AND NOT TAXABLE BY FLORIDA COUNTY
GOVERNMENTS
Section 196.001 states that "[a]ll real and personal property" is property
subject to taxation, unless expressly exempted. The Florida Constitution
provides that local governments and counties may assess ad valorem taxation
on tangible personal property, but not on intangible personal property, as
taxation on intangible property is reserved to the State.23 The Fourth District
Court of Appeal found that Palm Beach County could not tax the Wireless
Services Software because, as "computer software," it is intangible personal
property and "not taxable by Palm Beach County. 24 I agree with this hold-
ing, as the Florida Legislature intended that courts treat "computer software"
not as tangible personal property, but rather, as intangible personal proper-
ty. 25
This issue involves a matter of statutory interpretation, namely whether
the legislature, through section 192.001, intended to treat "computer soft-
ware" as tangible or intangible personal property. 6 As such, the de novo
19. Nikolits, 9 So. 3d at 694.
20. Id. at 693.
21. Id. (quoting Gilreath v. Gen. Elec. Co., 751 So. 2d 705, 707-08 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 2000)) (citations omitted) (alteration in original); see also FLA. CONST. art. VII, §§ 1(a),
9(a).
22. FLA. STAT. § 196.001(1) (2009).
23. FLA. CONST. art. VII, §§ I(a), 9(a).
24. Nikolits, 9 So. 3d at 694.
25. See id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 192.001(19) (2009).
26. See FLA. STAT. § 192.001(19).
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standard of review is applied by an appellate court,27 which "simply means
the appellate court is free to decide the question of law, without deference to
the trial judge, as if the appellate court had been deciding the question in the
first instance. 28
"'[L]egislative intent is the polestar' of statutory interpretation. 29 To
determine such intent, an appellate court must first look to a statute's plain
language.30 If "the statute is clear and unambiguous, 'there is no occasion for
resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction; the statute
must be given its plain and obvious meaning."''3' However, "[i]f the mean-
ing of a statutory provision is deemed ambiguous, it must be subject to judi-
cial construction. 32 The purpose of the rules of statutory construction "is to
discover the true intention of the law. But such rules are useful only in case
of doubt and should never be used to create doubt, only to remove it.
'33
Amongst the rules of construction used by courts to rectify an ambigui-
ty is that remedial statutes are "liberally construed to advance the intended
remedy. 34 A remedial statute is broadly defined as a statute "intended to fix
an existing problem. 35 Another principle of statutory construction is that
"tax laws are to be construed strongly in favor of the taxpayer and against the
government, and that all ambiguities or doubts are to be resolved in favor of
the taxpayer., 36 In construing statutes, appellate courts will also read "'all
parts of a statute ...together in order to achieve a consistent whole."'
37
"Further, in construing a statute that is susceptible to more than one interpre-
27. See Zingale v. Powell, 885 So. 2d 277, 280 (Fla. 2004) ("Although we take into con-
sideration the district court's analysis on the issue, constitutional interpretation, like statutory
interpretation, is performed de novo.").
28. 2 PHILIP J. PADOVANO, FLORIDA APPELLATE PRACTICE § 18:4, at 339-40 (West 2009).
29. Saleeby v. Rocky Elson Constr., Inc., 3 So. 3d 1078, 1082 (Fla. 2009) (per curiam)
(quoting Knowles v. Beverly Enters.-Fla., Inc., 898 So. 2d 1, 5 (Fla. 2004) (per curiam)).
30. Id. (citing McKenzie Check Advance of Fla., L.L.C. v. Betts, 928 So. 2d 1204, 1208
(Fla. 2006)).
31. Id. (quoting Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984)).
32. Gulfstream Park Racing Ass'n v. Tampa Bay Downs, Inc., 948 So. 2d 599, 606 (Fla.
2006).
33. State v. Egan, 287 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1973).
34. Educ. Dev. Ctr., Inc. v. Palm Beach County, 751 So. 2d 621, 623 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1999).
35. RONALD BENTON BROWN & SHARON JACOBS BROWN, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION:
THE SEARCH FOR LEGISLATIVE INTENT 60 (2002).
36. Leadership Hous., Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 336 So. 2d 1239, 1242 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1976) (quoting Maas Bros., Inc. v. Dickinson, 195 So. 2d 193, 198 (Fla. 1967)).
37. Borden v. East-European Ins. Co., 921 So. 2d 587, 595 (Fla. 2006) (quoting Forsythe
v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So. 2d 452,455 (Fla. 1992)).
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tation, it is often helpful to refer to legislative history in order to ascertain the
Legislature's intent."38
As the Laws of Florida may impact an appellate court's analysis of a
statute, a discussion of its purpose and make-up is warranted. The Florida
Senate, in its Glossary of Terms, defines the Laws of Florida as:
A verbatim publication of the general and special laws enacted
by the Florida Legislature in a given year and published each year
following the regular session of the legislature. It presents the
laws in the order in which they are numbered by the Secretary of
State, as well as resolutions and memorials passed by the legisla-
ture.
39
The Florida Constitution also requires that every law has an "enacting
clause" that reads: "Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Flori-
da."40 Furthermore, although the Laws of Florida contain the provisions of a
bill, the legislature provided before the enacting clauses-i.e., the preamble
or prefatory language-of the Florida Statutes, as "official statute law of the
state immediately upon publication,"'" do not. This is because "[a] preamble
to a statute is an introductory or prefatory clause, preceding the enacting
clause, supplying the reasons and explanations for legislative enactments. It
is not part of a statute itself and has no substantive legal force and so cannot,
by itself, prescribe rights or establish duties. 42 As such, prefatory matters
stated before the enacting clause in the Laws of Florida are not included in
the Florida Statutes because they are not part of the official statutory law of
the state.43 Rather, this language may offer guidance for a court when a sta-
tute's plain meaning is ambiguous, as "preambles and findings and purposes
clauses can help resolve ambiguity" because they are relevant to a statute's
meaning.44
As stated in Nikolits, the Florida Statutes, via subsection 192.001(19),
provides a definition of "computer software. 45 In that definition, "computer
38. State v. Jefferson, 758 So. 2d 661, 665 (Fla. 2000).
39. The Florida Senate: Glossary of Terms, http://www.flsenate.gov/lnfoCenter/index.
cfm?Mode=Glossary&Submenu=3&Tab=infocenter&CFID=86199434&CFrOKEN=34982
315 (last visited Nov. 7, 2009).
40. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 6.
41. See FLA. STAT. § 11.2421 (2009).
42. 48A FLA. JUR. 2D Statutes § 57 (2007).
43. See id.
44. LINDA D. JELLUM, MASTERING STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 125 (2008).
45. Nikolits v. Verizon Wireless Pers. Commc'ns, L.P., 9 So. 3d 690, 692 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 2009).
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software" is defined as "personal property," but not as either tangible or in-
tangible personal property. 46 In the same statutory section, the Florida Sta-
tutes define tangible and intangible personal property, whose definitions fail
to include "computer software. 47  The statute's wording is, accordingly,
ambiguous as to whether "computer software" is tangible or intangible per-
sonal property, and the canons of construction may be invoked.
It is feasible that because the legislature included a definition of "com-
puter software" and tangible or intangible personal property, neither of which
expressly defines "computer software" as intangible personal property, the
legislature did not intend for "computer software" to be categorized as in-
tangible personal property. "Computer software," however, is intangible
personal property because a close examination of legislative intent affords
this result.
48
In first turning to the plain language of section 192.001, one may de-
termine that the Florida Legislature intended that "computer software" is not
tangible personal property. 49 As articulated by the Fourth District Court of
Appeal in Nikolits:
A close examination of the definition of tangible personal
property contained in section 192.001 compels the same result [as
the Fifth District reached in Gilreath]. In particular, that definition
states that tangible personal property is "all goods, chattels, and
46. FLA. STAT. § 192.001(19) (2009).
47. FLA. STAT. § 192.001(1 1)(b), (d). For purposes of taxation, the Florida Legislature
has provided the following definitions of tangible personal property and intangible personal
property:
(b) "Intangible personal property" means money, all evidences of debt owed to the taxpayer,
all evidences of ownership in a corporation or other business organization having multiple
owners, and all other forms of property where value is based upon that which the property
represents rather than its own intrinsic value.
(d) "Tangible personal property" means all goods, chattels, and other articles of value (but
does not include the vehicular items enumerated in s. l(b), Art. VII of the State Constitution
and elsewhere defined) capable of manual possession and whose chief value is intrinsic to the
article itself. "Construction work in progress" consists of those items of tangible personal
property commonly known as fixtures, machinery, and equipment when in the process of being
installed in new or expanded improvements to real property and whose value is materially en-
hanced upon connection or use with a preexisting, taxable, operational system or facility.
Construction work in progress shall be deemed substantially completed when connected with
the preexisting, taxable, operational system or facility. Inventory and household goods are ex-
pressly excluded from this definition.
Id.
48. See FLA. H.R. COMM. ON CMTY. AFFAIRS, HB 1723 (1997) BILL ANALYSIS &
ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT I (Apr. 15, 1997) [hereinafter HB 1723 BILL ANALYSIS &
ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT].
49. See FLA. STAT. § 192.001(1 1)(d).
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other articles of value.., capable of manual possession and whose
chief value is intrinsic to the article itself." § 192.001(1 1)(d). Al-
though computer software's value is intrinsic in and of itself, as
the "essence of the property is the software itself, and not the tang-
ible medium on which the software might be stored," Gilreath,
751 So. 2d at 708, it is property incapable of manual possession.
This is because, software, itself, is "not capable of being 'seen,
weighed, measured, felt or otherwise perceived by the senses."'
Id. (quoting Dallas Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Tech Data Corp., 930
S.W.2d 119, 122 (Tex. App. 1996)). Rather, the tangible medium
on which it is transported and transmitted is the means by which
the property is manually possessed.
Therefore, we ... hold that "computer software" is intangible
personal property. As such, we affirm the trial court's decision
that the Wireless Services Software is not taxable by Palm Beach
County, as it is intangible personal property, which is property
outside a county's taxing authority.
50
Furthermore, in examining the prefatory language of the 1997 Laws of
Florida, one can discern the legislative intent to treat "computer software" as
intangible personal property. 1 Specifically, although this provision was not
included in the subsequent Florida Statutes because it appeared before the
enacting clause, the 1997 Laws of Florida state that it is "the intent of the
Legislature to clarify that computer software, as defined in this act, is not
tangible personal property under the ad valorem tax laws of this state. 52 In
using this language as guidance, one can logically conclude that because the
legislature stated that "computer software" is not tangible, it intended it to be
categorized as intangible. This is because "[flor purposes of ad valorem tax-
ation, personal property is divided into" intangible personal property or tang-
ible personal property. 53 As such, if computer software is not tangible it
must logically be intangible.
The prefatory language in the Laws of Florida also states that it is the
"intent of the Legislature that the provisions of this act are remedial. ' '54 An
interpretation of "computer software" as intangible personal property adheres
to the rule of construction for remedial statutes because, to do so, is to liber-
ally construe the statute to achieve its perceived remedial purpose of tax re-
50. Nikolits, 9 So. 3d at 694.
51. See Act effective June 1, 1997, ch. 97-294, 1997 Fla. Laws 5333, 5333 (codified at
FLA. STAT. §§ 192.001, 196.012, .195-.196 (2009)).
52. Ch. 97-294, 1997 Fla. Laws at 5333.
53. 50 FLA. JUR. 2D Taxation § 80 (2006).
54. Ch. 97-294 1997 Fla. Laws at 5333.
[Vol. 34
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lief.55  The legislature's intent to provide tax relief by way of section
192.001(19) is embodied in a 1997 Florida House of Representative's Com-
mittee Report for House Bill 1723, which states that section 192.001(19)'s
definition of "computer software" was designed to "effectively remove[] the
value of software, except for the value of the diskette or other medium on
which the information is stored, from ad valorem taxation. 56 Moreover, an
interpretation of "computer software" as intangible personal property is in
accordance with the rule of construction that tax statutes are interpreted in
favor of the taxpayer, as such an interpretation grants the taxpayer relief."
Additionally, this interpretation is in accord with the Fifth District Court
of Appeal's decision in Gilreath v. General Electric Co.58 In Gilreath, the
Fifth District rendered a decision on the same question discussed in this is-
sue, i.e., whether computer software under section 192.001(19) is tangible or
intangible personal property.59 In that case, the court examined section
192.001(19), noting that the definition
made a sharp distinction between the information, program or rou-
tine (the "imperceptible binary impulses"), and the medium on
which the information, program or routine is carried. That is to
say, as the court interprets this amendment, the Legislature deter-
mined that the disk or tape itself was tangible personal property,
but the information, program or routine was not. The remainder of
the statute clearly indicates that the information, program or rou-
tine is not subject to local taxation, because it "does not increase
the value of the computer or computer-related peripheral equip-
ment, or any combination thereof.",
6
More importantly, the court also held that "'the fact that tangible prop-
erty is used to store or transmit the software's binary instructions does not
change the character of what is fundamentally a classic form of intellectual
property"' that is, in fact, "intangible property."'6 As such, "computer soft-
ware" is, itself, intangible property, regardless of its present status under the
Florida Statutes and, therefore, is subject to taxation as intangible personal
55. See BROWN & BROWN, supra note 35, at 59.
56. HB 1723 BILL ANALYSIS & EcONOMIC STATEMENT, supra note 48, at I (emphasis
added).
57. See BROWN & BROWN, supra note 35, at 59-60.
58. See Gilreath v. Gen. Elec. Co., 751 So. 2d 705, 706 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
59. Id. at 707.
60. Id. at 708-09.
61. Id. at 709 (quoting Ne. Datacom, Inc. v. City of Wallingford, 563 A.2d 688, 691
(Conn. 1989)).
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property by the State of Florida-not Florida county governments-if the
legislature so provides.62
Thus, in accordance with the intent of the Florida Legislature, the
Fourth District's holding in Nikolits was correct in its finding that "computer
software" was not taxable by Palm Beach County because it was not tangible
personal property, but rather intangible personal property.63
IV. THE FOURTH DISTRICT'S DECISION WAS CORRECT GIVEN
THE DEFINITION OF A COMPUTER AND THE FACT THAT A
PRESUMPTION OF CORRECTNESS WAS NOT APPLICABLE
TO THE PROPERTY APPRAISER'S FINDINGS
Another compelling question is whether the Fourth District Court of
Appeal acted improperly by not interpreting the word "computer" in favor of
the taxing authority and not giving a presumption of correctness to the Prop-
erty Appraiser's findings.64 As in Issue III, whether the trial court properly
interpreted the word computer in section 192.001(19) is a matter of statutory
interpretation that an appellate court reviews de novo.
65
A rule of statutory construction is that "'[w]hile doubtful language in
taxing statutes should be resolved in favor of the taxpayer, the reverse is
applicable in the construction of exceptions and exemptions from taxa-
tion."'66 This, however, is a rule of construction, which is not applicable if a
term is unambiguous. 67 As such, it "is inapplicable to construe language of a
statute that is not doubtful. 68 This is in accordance with the principle that,
absent an ambiguity or a statutory definition, the wording of a statute is giv-
en its plain and ordinary meaning.69 It is also assumed that a legislative body
knows the plain and ordinary meanings of the words it uses. 70 A word's
plain meaning is "'ascertained by reference to a dictionary. ' ' '7
62. Id.
63. See Nikolits v. Verizon Wireless Pers. Commc'ns L.P., 9 So. 3d 690, 693 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
64. See id.
65. Am. Honda Motor Co. v. Cerasani, 955 So. 2d 543, 545 (Fla. 2007) (emphasis add-
ed).
66. Markham v. PPI, Inc., 843 So. 2d 922, 925 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (quoting
Robbins v. Yusem, 559 So. 2d 1185, 1187 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990)).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Sieniarecki v. State, 756 So. 2d 68, 75 (Fla. 2000).
70. Hankey v. Yarian, 755 So. 2d 93, 96 (Fla. 2000).
71. Sieniarecki, 756 So. 2d at 75 (quoting Green v. State, 604 So. 2d 471, 473 (Fla.
1992)).
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It is feasible to argue that the meaning of the word "computer" used in
the definition of "computer software" is ambiguous, and because section
192.001(19) is a tax exemption, it should have been translated in favor of the
taxing authority.72 However, the Florida Legislature provided a definition of
the term "computer software"-not "computer. 7 3 The meaning of the term
computer, itself, is accordingly unambiguous because it is a word with a
plain and ordinary meaning ascertainable by reference to a dictionary, i.e., "a
high-speed electronic device that processes, retrieves, and stores pro-
grammed information. 74 Hence, there is no doubt or ambiguity as to the
plain meaning of the term "computer," making the rules of construction in-
applicable.
If an appellate court, however, did find an ambiguity regarding the defi-
nition of the term "computer," it should still interpret it in favor of the tax-
payer. This is because the rule of construction requiring a court to strictly
construe a tax statute as against the taxpayer is "'applicable in the construc-
tion of exceptions and exemptions from taxation,' 7,15 but not tax exclusions,
with section 192.001(19) being a tax exclusion and not a tax exemption.76
An examination of the Second District's decision in Department of Revenue
v. GTE Mobilnet of Tampa Inc.,77 shows why section 192.001(19) is a tax
exclusion.78
In that case, at issue was whether certain language in the definition of
"telecommunication service" was a tax exemption or tax exclusion. 7'9 The
Second District held that because the wording was "part of the statutory de-
finitions that determine what comes within the tax imposition language," it
operates not as an exemption, but as an exclusion. 80 The court held that this
was because the tax definition operated to exclude "telecommunication ser-
vice" from taxation by placing it outside the tax statute.8'
72. See FLA. STAT. § 192.001(19) (2009).
73. See id.
74. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY 231 (1995).
75. PPI, Inc., 843 So. 2d at 925 (quoting Robbins v. Yusem, 559 So. 2d 1185, 1187 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (emphasis omitted)).
76. See Dep't of Revenue v. GTE Mobilnet of Tampa Inc., 727 So. 2d 125, 1128 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999). "A tax exemption, [generally] is a statute that carves out a statutory
exception for something that otherwise would be within the scope of the taxing statute." Id.
By contrast, a tax exclusion is property that is not taxable because it is excluded from the tax
statute. See id.
77. Id. at 1125.
78. See id. at 1128.
79. GTE Mobilnet of Tampa Inc., 727 So. 2d at 1127-28.
80. Id. at 1128.
81. Id.
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Comparatively, the definition of "computer software" is a tax exclusion
because, like the definition of "telecommunication services" in GTE Mobil-
net of Tampa Inc., the definition of computer software is part of statutory
definitions that determine what comes within a tax statute.82 Also, like the
definition of "telecommunication service" in GTE Mobilnet of Tampa Inc.,
the definition of "computer software" excludes it from taxation by placing it
outside the taxing statute.83 In particular, section 192.001(19) states that if
software meets the definition of "computer software," and does not fit into
the "embedded software" exception, it is "personal property only to the ex-
tent of the value of the unmounted or uninstalled medium. 84 This places
computer software outside the tax statute because, as provided by the legisla-
ture, only "real and personal property" is subject to taxation,85 and "computer
software" is not personal property for the purposes of taxation.86
Therefore, even if a court finds that the term "computer" raises an am-
biguity, it is still correct in interpreting the statute in favor of the taxpayer
because section 192.001(19) is a tax exclusion-not a tax exemption.87
One may further argue that the Fourth District erred in its decision by
not cloaking with a presumption of correctness the Property Appraiser's
findings that the Wireless Services Software was taxable as tangible personal
property.88 I disagree, because Palm Beach County's Tax Appraiser misap-
plied the law by taxing intangible personal property as tangible personal
property.
It is a well-established rule that "[tiax assessors are constitutional offic-
ers and as such their actions are clothed with the presumption of correctness.
One asserting error on the part of the tax assessor must show by 'proof' that
every reasonable hypothesis has been excluded which would support the tax
assessor."89 If "the presumption of correctness should have been but was not
applied by the trial court," an appellate court may reverse the trial court's
findings.90 This presumption, however, does not apply if "the Property Ap-
praiser's assessment. . . was based on a misapplication of the law."'
82. Id. at 1126-27.
83. See id. at 1126-28.
84. FLA. STAT. § 192.001(19) (2009).
85. FLA. STAT. § 196.001(1) (2009).
86. See FLA. STAT. § 192.001(19).
87. See id; see also GTE Mobilnet of Tampa Inc., 727 So. 2d at 1128.
88. See Nikolits v. Verizon Wireless Pers. Commc'ns L.P., 9 So. 3d 690, 693 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
89. Straughn v. Tuck, 354 So. 2d 368, 371 (Fla. 1977) (citing Powell v. Kelly, 223 So. 2d
305, 308 (Fla. 1969)).
90. See Markham v. June Rose, 495 So. 2d 865, 866 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
91. See Wilkinson v. Kirby, 654 So. 2d 194, 196 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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In Nikolits, the presumption of correctness was not applicable.92 This is
because the Property Appraiser, by taxing intangible personal property as
tangible personal property, misapplied the tax statute.93 Accordingly, the
trial court did not err by not giving a presumption of correctness to the Prop-
erty Appraiser's findings. Therefore, because the trial court acted properly in
not construing section 192.001 against Verizon, and not cloaking the Proper-
ty Appraiser's findings with a presumption of correctness, the Fourth District
was correct in its holding. 94
V. CONCLUSION
Although a Florida county government would profit from taxing "com-
puter software" as tangible property-as exemplified in the one million dol-
lar loss to Palm Beach County due to the Nikolits decision 95-the Florida
Legislature has intended otherwise.96 Given Florida's strict separation of
powers scheme, 97 the Fourth District's decision correctly discerned and in-
terpreted the intent of the legislature. If it ruled to the contrary, it would
have encroached into the providence of the legislature by misconstruing and
misapplying the law in a way that the legislature did not intend.98
I do, however, recognize the importance and necessity of taxation to an
orderly form of government. Although "computer software" is not taxable as
tangible property, it may be taxable by the State as intangible personal prop-
erty. To do so, I recommend that the legislature expressly provide for this in
the definition of "computer software" by stating that "computer software" is
taxable as intangible personal property if it fits within the embedded software
exception. This will also definitively label section 192.001(19) a tax exemp-
tion by showing that computer software is in fact subject to taxation as per-
sonal property, but is otherwise exempt from taxation under section
192.001(19) unless it falls within that exemption's embedded software ex-
92. See Nikolits, 9 So. 3d at 693.
93. Id.
94. See id.
95. Billy Shields, Verizon Avoids $1 Million Palm Beach County Bill, BROWARD DAILY
Bus. REV., Apr. 16, 2009, at A3.
96. See id.
97. State v. Cotton, 769 So. 2d 345, 353 (Fla. 2000) ("This Court, on the other hand, in
construing the Florida Constitution, has traditionally applied a strict separation of powers
doctrine.").
98. See FLA. CONST. art. 11, § 3 (enumerating Florida's strict separation of powers scheme
by stating: "The powers of the state government shall be divided into legislative, executive
and judicial branches. No person belonging to one branch shall exercise any powers apper-
taining to either of the other branches unless expressly provided herein.").
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ception.99 Furthermore, it will bring within the State's taxing power the deli-
neated ability to tax a form of intangible property that now lingers outside
Florida's Tax Code, helping generate revenue for the State from a viable tax
source.
99. See FLA. STAT. § 192.001(19) (2009).
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